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Ira Winkler Talks Campus Network Security
by: David Geer
Securing College Web Portals \"First, the Web portals have to treat both the internal and external systems as hostile,\" says Ira Winkler, chief security strategist, Hewlett-Packard. Along with isolating the network, this is Mr. Winkler\'s top recommendation with reference to Web portals. As far as being audit-ready, even systems within systems should be hardened against intrusion. This includes insuring that all of the available security patches for all of the software have been downloaded and installed, that all permissions are set to minimal, and that you can verify and assess how completely these things have been done. In addition to hardening all the operating systems you need to harden all application software, the Web server being the prime example. \"Frequently, it\'s not the operating system that is compromised when somebody hacks it, it\'s the application, the Web server like Microsoft\'s Internet Information Server (IIS). Macromedia\'s ColdFusion was a really bad one for that,\" says Winkler. You need to harden any custom software as well. All software, even your homemade pride and joy, has some bugs in it. Test these applications and secure them. \"Hardening includes making sure that you don\'t have Perl [(an open source script programming language)] as an executable or other executable programs in the wrong directories and things like that,\" says Winkler. The next step is to assess the readiness of supporting hardware and software like firewalls, routers and database servers. A security hole in a router, for example, invites router intrusion, which leads to compromising the functions of the Web server. Having hardened everything and assured yourself that everything is secure, you audit by performing the same network scans that a hacker would perform. Commercial tools are preferred because these tend to be a little bit more comprehensive and give you better reporting capability, says Winkler. You should scan your systems regularly. New vulnerabilities can be discovered at any time and even human error can lead to an accidental system reconfiguration, leaving a hole behind. Rely on Industry? How can campuses and industry work together to minimize students becoming victims, or perpetrators of hacking - stealing bandwidth on campus networks, for example? \"A University has to have their own security program. No organization, academic or otherwise, should rely upon external parties for their own security. What you are basically doing is giving up control, which you should never do. Sometimes, for example, if the University\'s ISP is weak, that\'s an issue, but there are still things [the University] can do even if the ISP has its problems. As far as working together with industry, frankly, good security is really good systems administration. What you have to do is make sure that your systems are administered properly and that you have the appropriate access controls and intrusion detection, and that has the effect of making sure that you don\'t individually contribute to people hacking and violating the policies and procedures,\" says Winkler. Here\'s Ira\'s solution - minus leveraging industry. You need a solid, fundamental security program. You need good access controls. You need internal and external intrusion detection systems to see if anyone is behaving \"maliciously\" or even just \"unusually\". \"Check for policies and services provided by the network,\" says Winkler. Know how people are using your systems. Make sure no one is setting up your systems as \"Warez\" sites. \"If you see large scale downloading bandwidth, if you see services that shouldn\'t be running [you\'ve detected a problem].\" Policy administration tools like Polivec\'s Polivec 3 and Securify\'s SecurVantage line of products, and similar types of products, are now available and some of these might be worth looking into. Is Legislation a Solution? Very definitely. \"The Internet has had two decades to try and get a grasp on the system. And even though there are some good efforts being made, the good efforts are piecemeal and industry specific in many cases,\" says Winkler. When industry does setup standards or make recommendations, adherence is often voluntary, making enforcement poor or nonexistent and QoS relatively unmeasurable. The Internet is a conglomerate of large networks spread everywhere. \"Even if you have a whole industry like academia theoretically securing themselves, which would be impossible - telling every college all over the country that they are voluntarily going to secure themselves - if one other company [or campus] doesn\'t keep themselves secure, that\'s going to compromise the security of everyone,\" says Winkler. If one participant on the Internet doesn\'t secure against password sniffing for example, then campus constituents logging into the University from within or without are going to have accounts compromised [See Figures 1-3]. This affects people connecting to the Internet from the University, to the University remotely, everyone. \"The only way to [enforce security] is by mandatory regulation ... by the insurance industry or by government,\" says Winkler. [Heading: Compromise of the World Bank Entered Through Universities Using Password Sniffers] [Insert Figures 1, 2 & 3 here] [Figure 1 Caption: Courtesy of Ira Winkler, chief security strategist, Hewlett-Packard] [Figure 2 Caption: The path of the World Bank hack through Universities using Password Sniffers and other tools, Courtesy of Ira Winkler, chief security strategist, Hewlett-Packard] [Figure 3 Caption: Results of the World Bank hack, Courtesy of Ira Winkler, chief security strategist, Hewlett-Packard] Enforcement A good model of enforcement is the insurance industry response to the Y2K bug. \"Everybody was talking about Y2K but nobody was doing a thing about it until insurance companies started saying you are not going to get directors\' and officers\' insurance unless you have an appropriate Y2K program in place. Then the government passed laws that said that federal agencies have to have an acceptable Y2K program in place as well. Then you saw people taking action,\" says Winkler. Later, people claimed that the money spent to fix the Y2K bug was just poured down the drain because there were no major disasters related to the bug come the turn of the century. However, it\'s because the money was spent and the bug was patched that there were no problems. Another good model is the auto industry. Mr. Winkler\'s life was saved by a seatbelt, which would probably not have been available had seatbelt laws not been voted into law. Despite the automobile industry\'s opposition to seatbelts and airbags, the insurance industry lobbied congress until airbags and seatbelts were required. \"Without regulation, we\'re not going to see any significant improvement,\" says Winkler. The Big Picture - the Best Answer In the larger view the best solution is to insure that administration staff are effectively resourced and trained. There need to be enough people on staff, there needs to be a reasonable amount of money set aside for tools and access controls and anything else that is needed. You need to know and follow vendor recommendations for how many systems per administrator are permissible. \"Frequently organizations don\'t have a clue as to what that number is. What that means is that administrators tend to be fighting fires instead of proactively securing their systems. If they\'d be proactively securing their systems they wouldn\'t have to worry about fighting the fires,\" says Winkler. Social Engineering Colleges and Universities face about the same threat of social engineering as any group or organization. Social engineering is the manipulation of social interaction to gain access to information. \"Usually when you do social engineering it might be to try to get access to a company or something but University systems tend to be so widely open a hacker frequently doesn\'t have to resort to social engineering to get passwords or logins on University systems. Frankly just password guessing works in many cases,\" says Winkler. In Conclusion Part of maintaining security in an environment where you keep full control and take complete responsibility is being willing to say that if you can\'t secure it, you can\'t use it. Hypothetically, if you go the route of trying to leverage a company like Microsoft into adequately securing their products, you could theoretically be insecure forever waiting for them to really do something about it. If, however, you take the approach of total responsibility, tossing out what you can\'t adequately secure, you can then take a look at the vast array of open source solutions like Linux and decide that you have choices that allow you to take that responsibility, secure your systems fully and satisfy your constituents too. Ira\'s Nickel If network administrators and staff members are well trained and sufficient in number it will greatly reduce security holes. What if staff is short or resources are tight? \"It\'s a great experience for college students and everybody else to figure out how to protect systems. It\'s infinitely harder to protect systems than it is to figure out how to hack them. If you\'re in a University and you want to train people in computer science in useful skills, training people in how to secure systems proactively is going to be the most useful skill they could ever learn. That would help the University. Make sure they have people that are properly trained and maybe even give some of their computer science students extra credit - not for breaking into systems but for helping to secure and harden the systems,\" says Winkler. Sidebar One Who Hacks Higher Ed and Why? A lot of hackers break into University systems to use them as \"jumping points\" to much larger hacks. \"The number of University students that actually hack in the grand scheme of things is luckily a limited set of people. However, University systems tend to be so open that hackers use them as a regular jumping point to other places. For example, many of the computers that were involved in the distributed denial of service attacks that Mafiaboy committed [about early 2000], those occurred through a significant number of University hacks. Hacks into DOD systems went through University systems as well. In the case of an Argentinean hacker that was reported back in 1999, he stole 100\'s of 1,000\'s of passwords and used many Universities as jumping places to hack the U.S. military systems,\" says Ira Winkler, chief security strategist, Hewlett-Packard. Hackers also collect \"trophies\", hacking a University computer just to deface a campus Website and then hack on through to another internal system. Some hackers use more advanced hacks involving many systems in order to gain and maintain access, kind of like a sleeper agent, one day waking up to use the hole they\'ve discovered and reserved for themselves to do more harm. \"Once they compromise a system, they\'ll make a note and then use that system [later] to go ahead and compromise [other systems] so that they make some efforts to cover their tracks for distributed denial of service attacks,\" says Winkler, \"This is where our University computers are prime targets.\" Sidebar Two How things are getting better. Additional security measures for campus networks are becoming available. For example, while the 802.11g wireless standard has been ratified as of June, 2003, WPA security is coming to replace WEP and beef up wireless security. Security technologies like thumb print verification and authentication may eventually be practical for IT devices in University settings. Applications that are considered to be threats themselves, like Instant Messaging programs, are being beefed up and offered as more secure, enterprise level messaging clients, with their own secure servers. \"IBM/Lotus has an IM server called SameTime that addresses the security issue. It\'s worth injecting that Microsoft will release on October 21, the \"Microsoft Office Live Communications Server 2003\" product. This IM server not only deals with the security issues, but offers tight integration with Microsoft Office, Exchange and specifically the Outlook e-mail client,\" says Todd Clark, president, DenaliTEK, security consultants. Universities are becoming more aware. Through organizations like ACUTA and articles like these, IT managers and experts have the opportunity to form alliances, ask questions and pool resources.
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